WGU Introduction to Cryptography Exam Questions

When securely distributing a symmetric key over an untrusted network, a common approach is hybrid cryptography: use asymmetric cryptography to protect the symmetric key, then use the symmetric key for bulk encryption. To ensure only Employee B can recover the symmetric key, Employee A encrypts (wraps) that symmetric key using Employee B's public key. Because only Employee B should possess the matching private key, only B can decrypt the wrapped symmetric key. This is the same principle used in TLS key exchange (in older RSA key transport) and in secure email: encrypt the session key to the recipient's public key. Encrypting the symmetric key with Employee A's private key would not provide confidentiality---anyone with A's public key could reverse it, and it functions more like a signature than encryption. Employee B's private key should never be shared and is used only by B to decrypt. Therefore, for confidentiality of the shared symmetric key, the correct encryption key is Employee B's public key.

A salt is a unique, random value stored alongside a password hash and combined with the password during hashing. Its main security benefit is that it ensures identical passwords do not produce identical hashes across different accounts or systems. If two users choose the same password, their stored hashes will differ because their salts differ, which directly prevents attackers from spotting shared passwords by comparing hashes. Salts also defeat precomputation attacks such as rainbow tables, because an attacker would need to regenerate tables for each possible salt value---a task that becomes infeasible when salts are large and unique per password. Salt does not enforce password complexity rules (that's a policy/validation function), does not guarantee users choose different passwords, and does not prevent password reuse across sites. The correct statement is that salt makes the resulting hash different even for the same password, improving resistance to offline cracking at scale and eliminating the ''same hash = same password'' shortcut attackers rely on.

A cryptography framework provides a consistent, repeatable way to select, deploy, and manage cryptographic controls across an organization. Its key benefit is structure: it defines approved algorithms and key sizes, acceptable modes of operation, key management rules (generation, storage, rotation, revocation, backup), certificate handling, and secure protocol configurations (e.g., TLS settings). This reduces ad hoc implementations that often lead to vulnerabilities such as weak ciphers, key reuse, improper randomness, or missing integrity protections. A framework also clarifies roles and processes---who can access keys, how secrets are audited, and how exceptions are handled---improving governance and operational reliability. Importantly, it does not guarantee perfect security; no framework can eliminate all risk, and secure outcomes still depend on correct implementation, monitoring, and maintenance. It also does not eliminate the need for training; human error is a major source of crypto misconfiguration. While frameworks help with compliance, they are not solely about regulation; they are about sound security engineering and lifecycle management. Therefore, the primary benefit is providing a structured approach to implementing encryption practices.

A salt is a unique, random value stored alongside a password hash and combined with the password during hashing. Its main security benefit is that it ensures identical passwords do not produce identical hashes across different accounts or systems. If two users choose the same password, their stored hashes will differ because their salts differ, which directly prevents attackers from spotting shared passwords by comparing hashes. Salts also defeat precomputation attacks such as rainbow tables, because an attacker would need to regenerate tables for each possible salt value---a task that becomes infeasible when salts are large and unique per password. Salt does not enforce password complexity rules (that's a policy/validation function), does not guarantee users choose different passwords, and does not prevent password reuse across sites. The correct statement is that salt makes the resulting hash different even for the same password, improving resistance to offline cracking at scale and eliminating the ''same hash = same password'' shortcut attackers rely on.

Cryptography must evolve because threats, computing capabilities, and attack techniques continuously change. Algorithms once considered safe can become vulnerable due to cryptanalysis, implementation attacks, protocol flaws, or sheer increases in available compute power. Examples include the deprecation of SHA-1 for signatures, weakening of RC4, and migration away from older TLS versions and weak cipher suites. Frameworks also need to adapt to new environments---cloud architectures, IoT deployments, mobile devices---and new adversary models, including the long-term risk posed by quantum computing to current public-key systems. Adaptation includes updating standards, increasing key sizes where needed, adopting modern primitives (AEAD modes, stronger KDFs), improving key management practices (rotation, hardware-backed storage), and refining operational guidance (certificate lifetimes, revocation strategies). A rigid structure that never changes would lock organizations into obsolete protections and accumulate risk. Standardizing obsolete techniques or complying with outdated standards is the opposite of sound security engineering. Therefore, cryptography frameworks must adapt over time to respond to emerging threats and vulnerabilities and to maintain effective protection as the landscape evolves.