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S90.20: SOA Security Lab Dumps

Free Arcitura Education S90.20 Exam Dumps August 2026

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Question No: 1

MultipleChoice

Service Consumer A submits a request message with security credentials to Service A (1). The identity store that Service A needs to use in order to authenticate the security credentials can only be accessed via a legacy system that resides in a different service inventory. Therefore, to authenticate Service Consumer A, Service A must first forward the security credentials to the legacy system (2). The legacy system then returns the requested identity to Service A (3). Service A authenticates Service Consumer A against the identity received from the legacy system. If the authentication is successful, Service A retrieves the requested data from Database A (4), and returns the data in a response message sent back to Service Consumer A (5). Service A belongs to Service Inventory A which further belongs to Security Domain A and the legacy system belongs to Service Inventory B which further belongs to Security Domain B .(The legacy system is encapsulated by other services within Service Inventory B, which are not shown in the diagram.) These two security domains trust each other. Communication between Service A and the legacy system is kept confidential using transport-layer security. It was recently discovered that a malicious attacker, posing as Service Consumer A, has been accessing Service A .An investigation revealed that these attacks occurred because security credentials supplied by Service Consumer A were transmitted in plaintext. Furthermore, vulnerabilities to replay attacks and malicious intermediaries have been detected. Which of the following statements describes a solution that can counter these types of attacks?

Also, list the industry standards required by the proposed solution.

Options

AApply the Data Origin Authentication pattern together with the Data Confidentiality pattern in order to establish message-layer security that guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of messages exchanged by Service Consumer A and Service A .Further, a security policy can be created to require that security credentials submitted to Service A must be digitally signed and encrypted and also contain a timestamp to validate the actual time the request was issued. Industry standards that can be used for this solution are WS-Policy, WS-Security-Policy, XMLEncryption, and XML-Signature.

BApply the Service Perimeter Guard pattern together with the Trusted Subsystem pattern to establish a perimeter service that can perform security functions on behalf of Service A .Theutility service can verify the validity of the request messages from Service Consumer A by authenticating the request message against an identity store. If the request message is authenticated, the utility service then sends it to Service A for further processing. All communications between Service A and Service Consumer A can be encrypted using the public key of the intended recipient, and signed using the private key of the sender. Industry standards that can be used for this solution are XML-Encryption, XML-Signature, and WS-Trust.

CApply the Service Perimeter Guard pattern to establish a perimeter service that can perform security functions on behalf of-Service A .Next, apply the Data Confidentiality pattern so that the security credential information provided by Service Consumer A with the request message is encrypted with the secret key shared between the perimeter service and Service Consumer A .The perimeter service evaluates the credentials and if successfully authenticated, forwards the request message to Service A .Transport-layer security is used to protect message exchanges between Service A and Service Consumer A .

DApply the Trusted Subsystem pattern together with the Data Origin Authentication pattern in order to establish a utility service-that performs the security processing on behalf of Service A .Service Consumer A must digitally sign all request messages and encrypt the credential information using the public key of the utility service. The utility service can then verify the security credentials and the digital signature to establish the validity of the request message. If the request message is permitted, the utility service establishes a composite trust domain that encompasses Service Consumer A, Service A, Database A, and the legacy system. Because all communications remain within a single trust domain, malicious intermediaries will not be able to gain access to any exchanged data.

Answer
A

Question No: 2

MultipleChoice

Service Consumer A sends a request message with an authentication token to Service A, but before the message reaches Service A, it is intercepted by Service Agent A (1). Service Agent A validates the security credentials and also validates whether the message is compliant with Security Policy A .If either validation fails, Service Agent A rejects the request message and writes an error log to Database A (2A). If both validations succeed, the request message is sent to Service A (2B). Service A retrieves additional data from a legacy system (3) and then submits a request message to Service B Before arriving at Service B, the request message is intercepted by Service Agent B (4) which validates its compliance with Security Policy SIB then Service Agent C (5) which validates its compliance with Security Policy B .If either of these validations fails, an error message is sent back to Service A .that then forwards it to Service Agent A so that it the error can be logged in Database A (2A). If both validations succeed, the request message is sent to Service B (6). Service B subsequently stores the data from the message in Database B (7). Service A and Service Agent A reside in Service Inventory A .Service B and Service Agents B and C reside in Service Inventory B .Security Policy SIB is used by all services that reside in Service Inventory B .Service B can also be invoked by other service consumers from Service Inventory B .Request messages sent by these service consumers must also be compliant with Security Policies SIB and B .Access to the legacy system in Service Inventory A is currently only possible via Service A, which means messages must be validated for compliance with Security Policy A .A new requirement has emerged to allow services from Service Inventory B to access the legacy system via a new perimeter service that will be dedicated to processing request messages from services residing in Service Inventory B .Because the legacy system has no security features, all security processing will need to be carried out by the perimeter service. However, there are parts of Security Policy A that are specific to Service A and do not apply to the legacy system or the perimeter service. Furthermore, response messages sent by the perimeter service to services from Service Inventory B will still need to be validated for compliance to Security Policy B and Security Policy SIB .How can the Policy Centralization pattern be correctly applied without compromising the policy compliance requirements of services in both service inventories?

Options

AIn order for Security Policy A to be centralized so that it can be shared by Service A and the new perimeter service, messages sent to the perimeter service from services in Service Inventory B will need to continue complying with Security Policy A, even if it requires that the messages contain content that does not relate to accessing the legacy system. In order to centralize Security-Policy B it will need to be combined with Security Policy SIB, which means that the functionality within Service Agents B and C can be combined into a single service agent.

BA single centralized security policy can be created by combining Security Policy A, Security Policy B .and Security Policy SIB into a single security policy that is shared by services in both Service Inventory A and Service Inventory B .This means that the new perimeter service can share the same new security policy with Service A .This further simplifies message exchange processing because request messages sent by services in Service Inventory B to the new perimeter service need to comply to the same security policy as the response messages sent back by the perimeter service to the services in Service Inventory B .

CThe parts of Security Policy A that are required for access to the new perimeter service need to be removed and placed into a new security policy that is shared by Service A and the perimeter service. Messages sent by services accessing the perimeter service from Service Inventory B will need to be compliant with the new security policy. Because the perimeter service is dedicated to message exchange with services from Service Inventory B, response messages sent by the perimeter service can be designed for compliance to Security Policy B and Security Policy SIB .

DDue to the amount of overlap among Security Policy A, Security Policy B, and Security Policy SIB, the Policy Centralization pattern cannot be correctly applied to enable the described message exchange between the perimeter service in Service Inventory A and services in Service Inventory B .

Answer
C

Question No: 3

MultipleChoice

Services A, B, and C reside in Service Inventory A and Services D, E, and F reside in Service Inventory B .Service B is an authentication broker that issues WS-Trust based SAML tokens to Services A and C upon receiving security credentials from Services A and C .Service E is an authentication broker that issues WS-Trust based SAML tokens to Services D and F upon receiving security credentials from Services D and E .Service B uses the Service Inventory A identify store to validate the security credentials of Services A and C .Service E uses the Service Inventory B identity store to validate the security credentials of Services D and F .To date, the two service inventories have existed independently from each other. However, a requirement has emerged that the services in Service Inventory A need to be able to use the services in Service Inventory B, and vice versa. How can cross-service inventory message exchanges be enabled with minimal changes to the existing service inventory architectures and without introducing new security mechanisms?

Options

ABecause SAML tokens cannot be used across multiple security domains, authentication brokers C and E need to be replaced with one single authentication broker so that one token issuer is used for all services across both of the service inventories.

BThe current security mechanism already fulfills the requirement because SAML tokens can be used across multiple security-domains. The only change required is for each authentication broker to be configured so that it issues service inventory-specific assertions for SAML tokens originating from other service inventories.

CThe individual domain service inventories need to be combined into one enterprise service inventory. The Service Perimeter Guard pattern can be applied to establish a contact point for request messages originating from outside the service inventory. Within the service inventory, services no longer need to be authenticated because they are all part of the same trust boundary.

DThe Trusted Subsystem pattern is applied to encapsulate Services B and E using a central utility service that balances request and response messages exchanged between Services B and E, depending on which service inventory the messages originate from. The utility service also contains transformation logic to ensure that the SAML tokens issued by Services B and E are compatible. This guarantees that an issued SAML token can be used across Service Inventories A and B without further need for runtime conversion.

Answer
B

Question No: 4

MultipleChoice

Service A provides a data retrieval capability that can be used by a range of service consumers, including Service Consumer A .In order to retrieve the necessary data, Service Consumer A first sends a request message to Service A (1). Service A then exchanges request and response messages with Service B (2, 3), Service C (4, 5), and Service D (6. 7). After receiving all three response messages from Services B .C .and D, Service A assembles the collected data into a response message that it returns to Service Consumer A (8). The owner of Service A charges service consumers for each usage of the data retrieval capability. Recently, the owner of Service Consumer A has complained that the data returned by Service A is incorrect, incomplete, and from invalid sources. As evidence, the Service Consumer A owner has presented the owner of Service A with sample messages containing the incorrect and incomplete contents. As a result, the Service Consumer A owner has refused to pay the usage fees. Subsequent to an internal investigation, the owner of Service A determines that the data returned by Service A is consistently correct and complete. There are suspicions that the Service Consumer A owner is altering the original messages and issuing these complaints fraudulently in order to avoid paying the usage fees. How can the owner of Service A prove that Service A is returning correct and complete data and that this data originated from the correct sources?

Options

AApply the Data Origin Authentication and the Data Confidentiality patterns to ensure that request and response messagesexchanged between Service A and Services B .C, and D are digitally signed and encrypted. This guarantees message integrity and confidentiality.

BApply the Data Origin Authentication pattern to verily that request and response messages exchanged by Service Consumer A and Service A and exchanged by Service A and Services B, C, and D originated from the claimed sources and have not been altered prior to transmission. Also, enhance the Service A architecture so that all messages sent to its service consumers are logged.

CApply the Brokered Authentication pattern to send the security credentials of Service Consumer A to Services B, C, and D.Service A can carry out the brokered authentication logic and therefore act as the intermediary security broker. Upon receiving Service Consumer A's request message, Service A can further verify the credentials against an external certificate authority, if the request is authenticated. Service A can create a signed SAML assertion containing Service Consumer A's credentials and the authorization information. Service A then forwards the original request message and the signed SAML assertion to Services B,C, and D .

DThe service contract of Service A can be extended with an ignorable WS-Policy assertion that states that all request and response messages are logged by Service A and that false complaints will be prosecuted.

Answer
B

Question No: 5

MultipleChoice

Service Consumer A sends a request message to Service A (1) after which Service A retrieves financial data from Database A (2). Service A then sends a request message with the retrieved data to Service B (3). Service B exchanges messages with Service C (4) and Service D (5), which perform a series of calculations on the data and return the results to Service A .Service A uses these results to update Database A (7) and finally sends a response message to Service Consumer A (8). Component B has direct, independent access to Database A and is fully trusted by Database A .Both Component B and Database A reside within Organization A .Service Consumer A and Services A, B, C, and D are external to the organizational boundary of Organization A .Service A has recently experienced an increase in the number of requests from Service Consumer A .However, the owner of Service Consumer A has denied that Service Consumer A actually sent these requests. Upon further investigation it was determined that several of these disclaimed requests resulted in a strange behavior in Database A, including the retrieval of confidential data. The database product used for Database A has no feature that enables authentication of consumers. Furthermore, the external service composition (Services A, B, C, D) must continue to operate at a high level of runtime performance. How can this architecture be improved to avoid unauthenticated access to Database A while minimizing the performance impact on the external service composition?

Options

AService Consumer A generates a pair of private/public keys (Public Key E and Private KeyD) and sends the public key to-Service A .Service A can use this key to send confidential messages to Service Consumer A because messages encrypted by the public key of Service Consumer A-can only be decrypted by Service A The Data Origin Authentication pattern can be further applied so that Service A can authenticate Service Consumer A by verifying the digital signature on request messages. The Message Screening pattern is applied to a utility service that encapsulates Database A in order to prevent harmful input.

BThe Brokered Authentication pattern is applied so that each service consumer generates a pair of private/public keys and sends the public key to Service A .When any service in the external service composition (Services A, B, C, and D) sends a request message to another service, the request message is signed with the private key of the requesting service (the service acting as the service consumer). The service then authenticates the request using the already established public key of the service consumer. If authentication is successful, the service generates a symmetric session key and uses the public key of the service consumer to securely send the session key back to the service consumer. All further communication is protected by symmetric key encryption. Because all service consumers are authenticated, all external access to Database A is secured.

CA utility service is established to encapsulate Database A and to carry out the authentication of all access to the database by Service A and any other service consumers. To further support this functionality within the utility service, an identity store is introduced. This identity store is also used by Service A which is upgraded with its own authentication logic to avoid access by malicious service consumers pretending to be legitimate service consumers. In order to avoid redundant authentication by services within the external service composition, Service A creates a signed SAML assertion that contains the service consumer's authentication and authorization information.

DImplement a firewall between Service Consumer A and Service A .All access to Service A is then controlled by the firewall rules. The firewall contains embedded logic that authenticates request messages and then forwards permitted messages to Service A .Moreover, the firewall can implement the Message Screening pattern so that each incoming message is screened for malicious content. This solution minimizes the security processing performed by Service A in order to maintain the performance requirements of the external service composition.

Answer
C

Question No: 6

MultipleChoice

Services A, B, and C reside in Service Inventory A and Services D, E, and F reside in Service Inventory B .Service B is an authentication broker that issues WS-Trust based SAML tokens to Services A and C upon receiving security credentials from Services A and C .Service E is an authentication broker that issues WS-Trust based SAML tokens to Services D and F upon receiving security credentials from Services D and E .Service B uses the Service Inventory A identify store to validate the security credentials of Services A and C .Service E uses the Service Inventory B identity store to validate the security credentials of Services D and F .It is decided to use Service E as the sole authentication broker for all services in Service Inventories A and B .Service B is kept as a secondary authentication broker for load balancing purposes. Specifically, it is to be used for situations where authentication requests are expected to be extra time consuming in order to limit the performance burden on Service E .Even though Service B has all the necessary functionality to fulfill this new responsibility, only Service E can issue SAML tokens to other services. How can these architectures be modified to support these new requirements?

Options

AWhen time consuming authentication requests are identified, Service E can forward them to Service B .Upon performing the authentication, Service B sends its own signed SAML token to Service E .Because Service E trusts Service B .it can use the Service B-specific SAML token to issue an official SAML token that is then sent to the original service consumer (that requested authentication) and further used by other services.

BTo provide load balancing, a service agent needs to be implemented to intercept all incoming requests to Service E .The-service agent uses a random distribution of the authentication requests between Service B and Service E .Because the request messages are distributed in a random manner, the load between the two authentication brokers is balanced.

CBecause both Service B and Service E issue SAML tokens, these tokens are interchangeable. In order for both services to-receive the same amount of authentication requests, a shared key needs to be provided to them for signing the SAML tokens. By signing the SAML tokens with the same key, the SAML tokens generated by Service B cannot be distinguished from the SAML tokens generated by Service E .

DBecause the federation requirements ask for SAML tokens generated by Service E, Service B cannot function as an-authentication broker. To address the load balancing requirement, a new utility service needs to be introduced to provide functionality that is redundant with Service E .This essentially establishes a secondary authentication broker to which Service E can defer time-consuming authentication tasks at runtime.

Answer
B

Question No: 7

MultipleChoice

Service Consumer A sends a request message to Service A (1), after which Service A sends a request message to Service B (2). Service B forwards the message to have its contents calculated by Service C (3). After receiving the results of the calculations via a response message from Service C (4), Service B then requests additional data by sending a request message to Service D (5). Service D retrieves the necessary data from Database A (6), formats it into an XML document, and sends the response message containing the XML-formatted data to Service B (7). Service B appends this XML document with the calculation results received from Service C, and then records the entire contents of the XML document into Database B (8). Finally, Service B sends a response message to Service A (9) and Service A sends a response message to Service Consumer A (10). Services A, B and D are agnostic services that belong to Organization A and are also being reused in other service compositions. Service C is a publicly accessible calculation service that resides outside of the organizational boundary. Database A is a shared database used by other systems within Organization A and Database B is dedicated to exclusive access by Service B .Service B has recently been experiencing a large increase in the volume of incoming request messages. It has been determined that most of these request messages were auto-generated and not legitimate. As a result, there is a strong suspicion that the request messages originated from an attacker attempting to carry out denial-of-service attacks on Service B .Additionally, several of the response messages that have been sent to Service A from Service B contained URI references to external XML schemas that would need to be downloaded in order to parse the message data. It has been confirmed that these external URI references originated with data sent to Service B by Service C .The XML parser currently being used by Service A is configured to download any required XML schemas by default. This configuration cannot be changed. What steps can be taken to improve the service composition architecture in order to avoid future denial-of-service attacks against Service B and to further protect Service A from data access-oriented attacks?

Options

AApply the Data Origin Authentication pattern so that Service B can verify that request messages that claim to have been sent by Service A actually did originate from Service A .Apply-the Message Screening pattern to add logic to Service A so that it can verify that external URIs in response messages from Service B refer to trusted sources.

BApply the Service Perimeter Guard pattern to establish a perimeter service between Service B and Service C .Apply the-Brokered Authentication pattern by turning the perimeter service into an authentication broker that is capable of ensuring that only legitimate response messages are being sent to Service C from Service B Further apply the Data Origin Authentication pattern to enable the perimeter service to verify that messages that claim to have been sent by Service C actually originated from Service C .Apply the Message Screening pattern to add logic to the perimeter service to also verify that URIs in request messages are validated against a list of permitted URIs from where XML schema downloads have been pre-approved.

CApply the Service Perimeter Guard pattern and the Message Screening pattern together to establish a service perimeter guard that can filter response messages from Service C before they reach Services A and B .The filtering rules are based on the IP address of Service C .If a request message originates from an IP address not listed as one of the IP addresses associated with Service C .then the response message is rejected.

DApply the Direct Authentication pattern so that Service C is required to provide security credentials, such as Username tokens, with any response messages it sends to Service B .Furthermore, add logic to Service A so that it can validate security credentials passed to it via response messages from Service B .by using an identity store that is shared by Services A and B .

Answer
A

Question No: 8

MultipleChoice

Component B is considered a mission critical program that requires guaranteed access to and fast response from Database A .Service A was recently the victim of a denial of service attack, which resulted in Database A becoming unavailable for extended periods of time (which further compromised Component B). Additionally, Services B, C, and D have repeatedly been victims of malicious intermediary attacks, which have further destabilized the performance of Service A .How can this architecture be improved to prevent these attacks?

Options

AA utility service is created to encapsulate Database A and to assume responsibility for authenticating all access to the database by Service A and any other service consumers. Due to the mission critical requirements of Component B, the utility service further contains logic that strictly limits the amount of concurrent requests made to Database A from outside the organizational boundary. The Data Confidentiality and Data Origin Authentication patterns are applied to all message exchanged within the external service composition in order to establish message-layer security.

BService Consumer A generates a private/public key pair and sends this public key and identity information to Service A .Service A generates its own private/public key pair and sends it back to Service Consumer A .Service Consumer A uses the public key of Service A to encrypt a randomly generated session key and then sign the encrypted session key with the private key. The encrypted, signed session key is sent to Service A .Now, this session key can be used for secure message-layer communication between Service Consumer A and Service A .The Service Perimeter Guard pattern is applied to establish a perimeter service that encapsulates Database A in order to authenticate all external access requests.

CServices B, C, and D randomly generate Session Key K, and use this key to encrypt request and response messages with symmetric encryption. Session Key K is further encrypted itself asymmetrically. When each service acts as a service consumer by invoking another service, it decrypts the encrypted Session Key K and the invoked service uses the key to decrypt the encrypted response. Database A is replicated so that only the replicated version of the database can be accessed by Service A and other external service consumers.

DThe Direct Authentication pattern is applied so that when Service Consumer A submits security credentials, Service A will be able to evaluate the credentials in order to authenticate the request message. If the request message is permitted, Service A invokes the other services and accesses Database A .Database A is replicated so that only the replicated version of the database can be accessed by Service A and other external service consumers.

Answer
A

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